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THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND COLLECTIVE 
DEFENSE AT 70: CONFESSION AND RESPONSE REVISITED 
Michael N. Schmitt* 
On the birth of the North Atlantic Alliance seven decades ago,1 
Georg Schwarzenberger, the great British legal scholar, observed: 
The North Atlantic Pact is a confession and a response. It is a 
confession of the constitutional inability of the United Nations to 
achieve its avowed main purpose of maintaining world order. It is a 
response to the insidious attempts of the Soviet Union to gain the fruits 
of another major war by all measures short of open war with the 
Western powers.2 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—also known as the Washington Treaty,3 
which provides for the collective defense of the Alliance, was the practical 
response to that confession. Yet by the turn of the 21st century, the need for 
confession and response seemed to be fading away. The Soviet Union had 
collapsed, the Warsaw Pact was gone, democracy was on the rise throughout 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet space, and the global security environment 
had become unipolar, with the United States exercising apparently benign 
 
 * Professor of International Law, University of Exeter; Howard S. Levie Professor, U.S. Naval War 
College; Francis Lieber Distinguished Scholar, US Military Academy at West Point. The author is appreciative 
of the invaluable assistance of the Allied Command Transformation legal team, especially Mr. Lewis 
Bumgardner, and of the NATO Legal Adviser, Mr. Steven Hill. Views expressed are solely those of the author 
in his personal capacity. 
 1 See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 224, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. The North Atlantic Treaty 
established a grouping of States known as the North Atlantic Alliance (or North Atlantic Pact). The title “North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization” was coined in the North Atlantic Council Final Communiqué of September 17, 
1949. Final Communiqué, Sept. 17, 1949. NATO was established two years later with adoption of the NATO 
Status of Forces Agreement, and then the Paris Protocol and the Ottawa Agreement. See Agreement Between 
the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 
U.N.T.S. 67; Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up Pursuant to the North Atlantic 
Treaty, Aug. 28, 1952, 5 U.S.T. 870, 200 U.N.T.S. 340; Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, National Representatives and International Staff, Sept. 20, 1951, 5 U.S. T. 1087, 200 U.N.T.S 3. 
 2 Georg Schwarzenberger, The North Atlantic Pact, 2 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 309, 309 
(1949). On announcing the text of the proposed North Atlantic Treaty in March 1949, Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson noted with reference to the United Nations, “The system is not working as effectively as we hoped 
because one of its members has attempted to prevent it from working. By obstructive tactics and the misuse of 
the veto, the Soviet Union has seriously interfered with the work of the Security Council in maintaining 
international peace and security.” Dean Acheson, Broadcast on Atlantic Accord, Radio Address to the Nation 
(March 18, 1949), in N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1949, http://movies2.nytimes.com/library/world/global/ 
031949nato-acheson-text.html [hereinafter Acheson Address].  
 3 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5. 
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supremacy.4 In light of these tectonic shifts, it appeared that the United Nations 
was on the verge of finally having assumed its intended collective security—as 
distinct from collective defense—role, as it had been in the process of doing for 
a number of years, most notably in the Balkans.5 In the eyes of many, there was 
no longer an existential threat against which the West was forced to organize in 
preparation for aggression. Although the Alliance continued to espouse its core 
mission of collective defense, the organization realized it had to transform.6 
Some questioned the need for NATO at all.7 
Predictions of an “end of history” and expectations of an impending “peace 
dividend” proved premature.8 New threats emerged on the security horizon, 
especially transnational terrorism. Indeed, the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5 
collective defense provision would for the first time in its history be invoked not 
in response to an attack by Warsaw Pact forces, but rather one mounted by a 
transnational terrorist group operating from within Alliance territory and 
employing rudimentary weapons, such as box cutters.9 In the aftermath of the 
tragic events of September 11, 2001, NATO would play a central role in the 
 
 4 See generally, A Short History of NATO, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., https://www.nato.int/cps/ 
en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
 5 “Collective defense” refers to the right of one or more States to come to the assistance of a State (or 
States) that is the object of an armed attack pursuant to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international 
law. See U.N. Charter art. 51. “Collective security,” in contrast, refers to a mechanism by which security in 
general is maintained. In the U.N. Charter context, the collective security arrangement is set forth in Chapter 
VII, which allows the Security Council to authorize or mandate action pursuant to Article 42, including the use 
of force, once the Security Council has identified a situation as a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression” in accordance with Article 39. Id. at ch. VII, art. 39, 42 An armed attack would qualify as such, 
but Article 39 is not limited to its occurrence. Rather, the Security Council action may either be designed to 
“restore international peace and security” in the event of a breach of the peace or of aggression or maintain it in 
the face of a threat to the peace. Id. at arts. 39–42, 51. An organization may have both purposes, as is the case 
with the Organization of American States. Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), art. 5, 
Sept. 2, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 [hereinafter Rio Treaty]; Charter of the Organization of 
American States, arts. 28–29, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 6 London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, NATO: ON-LINE LIBRARY (Oct. 27, 
2000), https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm. 
 7 See, e.g., John Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War, 15(1) INT’L 
SECURITY 5, 52 (1990); Statement of Kenneth N. Waltz, Conditions for Security in a Multipolar World in 
RELATIONS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 101ST 
CONG., 2ND SESS. (1991). 
 8 FRANCIS FUKIYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992); Ann Masrkusen, How We Lost 
the Peace Dividend, 33 AM. PROSPECT 86 (1997). 
 9 See A SHORT HISTORY OF NATO supra note 4.  
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effort to secure peace and maintain international security, even beyond the 
organization’s borders.10 
Today, NATO is at another inflection point in its history. Still the preeminent 
military alliance in the world, it faces unprecedented external and internal 
threats. Externally, a revanchist Russia is in belligerent occupation of territory 
on NATO’s border in Ukraine, a country that has had a special relationship with 
the Alliance since 1991, when Ukraine joined the Atlantic Cooperation 
Council.11 In light of the ongoing international armed conflict between Russia 
and Ukraine, the Baltic nations that border Russia rightly worry that, given their 
size and significant ethnic Russian populations, they could be next.12 In light of 
the Russian veto on the Security Council, this menace cannot be left to the 
United Nations to handle.  
The threats to the Alliance’s members (“Allies”) today are not limited to 
classic attack by the armed forces of another State—or States. As noted by the 
NATO Heads of State and Government in their 2018 Brussels Summit 
Declaration, stability and security is also endangered by hostile cyber 
operations; “crises across the Middle East and Africa [that] are fueling 
terrorism” and “contribute to irregular migration and human trafficking;” the 
crisis in Syria which “has a direct effect on the stability of the region and the 
security of the Alliance as a whole;” “hybrid challenges, including 
disinformation campaigns and malicious cyber activities;” and “proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and advanced missile technology.”13 In 2016, at the 
Warsaw Summit, NATO leaders had also noted that the “trafficking of arms, 
drugs, and human being across the Sahel-Sahara region continue to threaten 
regional and our own security” and highlighted the continuing threat posed by 
piracy.14 
Nevertheless, collective defense pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty remains the foundational and motivational purpose of the Alliance. This 
was confirmed by NATO member States during the Brussels Summit, which 
observed that “[t]he greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and 
 
 10 Id. 
 11 Relations with Ukraine, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jul. 1, 2009), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ 
natohq/topics_37750.htm?selectedLocale=en#.  
 12 See, e.g. Estonia’s Defense Minister Juri Luik on Russian Threats and Defending the Baltics, DEFENSE 
NEWS (Sept. 17, 2018) (discussing this worry), https://www.defensenews.com/interviews/2018/09/17/estonias-
defense-minister-on-russian-threats-and-defending-the-baltics/.  
 13 Id.  
 14 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, July 9, 2016, ¶¶ 31, 90 [hereinafter Warsaw Summit Communiqué].  
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defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of 
the Washington Treaty. No one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of 
any of its members were to be threatened.”15  
This article, together with the others in this special issue of the Emory 
International Law Review, celebrates the 70th anniversary of the Alliance. 
Survival of the world’s most effective military alliance over seven decades is 
best explained by the shared and continuing commitment of the Allies to the 
collective defense of the Euro–Atlantic States that is provided for in Article 5 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty.16 The focus here is on that single provision, without 
which there would be no Alliance. It begins with a review of the genesis and 
history of the Article 5 commitment. The foundation laid, the wording of the 
provision is normatively deconstructed. In particular, this contribution raises and 
comments upon issues in the application of Article 5 with regard to which a 
degree of uncertainty remains. Finally, thoughts as to the significance of 
collective defense within the Alliance are offered. 
I. THE GENESIS OF ARTICLE 5 
It is sometimes forgotten that the prohibition on the use of force is of 
relatively recent vintage in modern international law.17 Only in the mid-20th 
century did it emerge fully formed. Along with that prohibition, a corresponding 
sine qua non exception for situations necessitating self-defense was also 
codified.18  
Some tentative progress was made towards a use of force prohibition in the 
1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions (I), Article 2 Common of which provided 
for reference to good offices or mediation in the event of an “appeal to arms.”19 
Parallel progress was made in Article 1 of the 1907 Hague Convention (II), 
which banned the use of force, except in certain specified circumstances, for the 
 
 15 Press Release, NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration, ¶ 33 (JULY 11, 2018) [hereinafter Brussels 
Summit]. 
 16 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.  
 17 See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, chs. 3–4 (6th ed. 2017); see Roberto 
Ago, ILC Special Rapporteur, Addendum: Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318/Add. 
5-7, II(1), reprinted in 1980 ILC Y.B. 13, 51–52. 
 18 See generally DINSTEIN, supra note 17. 
 19 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art. 2, 36 Stat. 2199 (1907); 
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art. 2, 32 Stat. 1779, 1 Bevans 230 
(1899). 
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purpose of recovering contractual debts owed to a State’s nationals.20 However, 
it was not until the adoption of the 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations that 
a broad prohibition appeared. Article 10 of that instrument required League 
members to “respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial 
integrity and existing political independence of Members of the League.”21  
Yet this prohibition was far from absolute. For instance, should a 
circumstance arise that was likely to lead to a resort to arms, member States were 
obligated to submit the matter to arbitration, judicial settlement, or an inquiry by 
the Council of the League.22 For three months following consideration of the 
matter, they were prohibited from going to war.23 Other provisions further 
narrowed the prohibition’s scope.24 Perhaps most importantly, the Covenant 
applied only between members, except when a non-member accepted the 
obligations set forth therein with respect to the settlement of a particular 
dispute.25 
During the interwar years, a number of attempts to extend these limited 
prohibitions were made; none bore fruit.26 Most significant was the 1928 
Kellogg–Briand Pact, which encompassed sixty-three States by the outbreak of 
World War II. Article 1 of the three-article treaty provided that the Parties 
“condemn[ed] recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and 
renounce[ed] it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one 
another.”27 By Article 2, they agreed that disputes “shall never be sought except 
 
 20 Hague Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the Recovery of Contract 
Debts, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607 (1907). 
 21 League of Nations Covenant, art. 10. 
 22 Id. at arts. 13, 17.  
 23 Id. at art. 12. 
 24 Id. at arts. 13, 15. 
 25 Id. at art. 17. 
 26 See, e.g., Geneva Protocol on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art. 22, 2 INT. LEG. 1378, 
1379 (1924). The Geneva Protocol on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was adopted by the 
Assembly of the League of Nations in 1924 but never entered into force. Id.  
 27 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (“Kellogg-Briand Pact”), 
art. 1, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (1928) [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact]; See 33 AM. J. INT’L L. Sp. Supp., 865 (1939) 
(for a list of the States that ratified or adhered to the Pact by the end of 1938.).  
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by pacific means.”28 Like the Covenant, the Pact applied only between States 
Party.29  
Prior to the 20th century, assertions that actions were being taken for 
defensive reasons were primarily political in character.30 But if the resort to force 
was generally to be prohibited by international law, it would be necessary to 
allow States to employ force defensively, including collectively, in certain 
circumstances. Thus, for example, Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations provided, “should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard 
of its covenants…it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war 
against all other Members of the League.”31 Hans Morgenthau labeled the article 
“the pioneering attempt at putting a system of collective security into effect.”32  
Similarly, by the 1925 Locarno Pact, Belgium and Germany, and France and 
Germany, agreed to refrain from going to war against each other; Great Britain 
and Italy served as guarantors.33 However, the pledge was subject to a number 
of exceptions. These included “the right of legitimate defence” in the face of a 
violation of the pledge or of specified conditions set forth in the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles that ended World War I, collective action as provided for in Article 
16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and, in the event of failure to 
implement collective action, such action as is “necessary for the maintenance of 
right and justice.”34  
Although the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact had failed to expressly provide for 
a right of self-defense, a number of Parties thereto asserted that right in 
reservations.35 Moreover, pursuant to the Pact’s Preamble, a Party that resorted 
to war was denied the benefits of the treaty, that is, the right to be free from acts 
of war directed against it.36 Effectively, this meant that a State was not bound by 
 
 28 Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 27, art. 2. 
 29 Id.  
 30 Georg Nolte & Albrecht Randelzhofer, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 51, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1397, 
1399 (Bruno Simma et. al. eds., 2012). 
 31 League of Nations Covenant, supra note 21, art. 16.  
 32 HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 232 (1949). 
 33 Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, art. 1, Oct. 16, 1925, 54 L.N.T.S. 289. 
 34 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. 
T.S. 188; Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, supra note 28, art. 2; Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, supra note 35, art. 2; 
League of Nations Covenant supra note 21, art. 15. 
 35 See Identical Notes of the United States to other Governments in Relation to the Pact, reprinted in 22 
AM. J. INT’L L., Supp., 109–13 (1928); replies at 23 AM. J. INT’L L., Supp., 1–13 (1929). 
 36 Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 27, pmbl. (“… any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to 
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the prohibition so long as it was employing force defensively against another 
Party. It would not be until adoption of the Charter of the United Nations in 
1945, however, that the right of self-defense as we know it today was codified 
in a multi-national instrument.37  
In light of the tragic conflagration that ravaged the international community 
during World War II, the drafters of the U.N. Charter were intent on ruling out 
the resort to force. The result was Article 2(4): “All Members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”38 
The Charter provided for two exceptions to this prohibition. The first 
allowed for uses of force authorized or mandated by the Security Council 
pursuant to Chapter VII of the instrument in order to “maintain or restore 
international peace or security.”39 Such collective security action had to be based 
on a finding by the Council that a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or 
act of aggression” exists.40 Today, there is no question that NATO may act, 
including through the use of force, pursuant to a Security Council Chapter VII 
resolution, as it has done on numerous occasions without meaningful objection 
from the international community.41 
However, States were understandably uneasy about relying entirely on a 
collective security mechanism for, after all, the League of Nations had failed 
 
promote its national interests by resort to war a should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty.”). 
 37 See U.N. Charter supra note 5.  
 38 Id. art. 2(4). 
 39 Id. art. 39. Pursuant to Article 53(1) of the Charter, the Security Council may authorize “regional 
arrangements or agencies” to take enforcement action under Chapter VII. Id. art. 53(1). NATO does not consider 
itself such an entity. See, e.g. NATO Secretary General, Minute Interpreting the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO 
Doc. PO/55/431 April 12, 1955, Annex A, Excerpt from Minutes of the 18th Meeting of the Washington 
Exploratory Talks on Security, ¶ 7, March 15, 1949 (on file with author); Statement of Deputy Assistant 
Secretary-General for Political Affairs of NATO, Mr. Robert F. Simmons, U.N.S.C. 5007th meeting (20 July 
2004), S/PV.5007. By contrast, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, formerly the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, is, for instance, a regional arrangement. Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe: Declarations and Decisions from Helsinki Summit, 10 July 1992, 31 I.L.M. 
1392, 1400 (1992). Other regional arrangements as envisioned under Article 53 include the OAS and 
Commonwealth of Independent States. See Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 5; Charter 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Jan. 22, 1993.  
 40 U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 39. 
 41 See id. at ch. VII. In 1992, the NAC expressed “the preparedness of our Alliance to support, on a case-
by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping operations under the authority of the 
U.N. Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for international peace and security.” Final 
Communiqué, Dec. 17, 1992. Since then, it has participated in numerous operations under this authority, most 
 
SCHMITTPROOFS2_10.24.19 10/28/2019 2:20 PM 
92 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
miserably. Therefore, the U.N. Charter expressly set forth, at the insistence of 
the United States, a right to self-defense in Article 51.42  
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.43 
Following adoption of the Charter in 1945, the alliance that had been formed to 
fight the Axis powers quickly unraveled. Indeed, less than a year later, former 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill would warn, in his “Sinews of Peace” speech, 
that:  
there is nothing [the Russians] admire so much as strength, and there 
is nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness, 
especially military weakness… If the Western Democracies stand 
together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter, their influence for furthering those principles will be immense 
and no one is likely to molest them.44  
His warning was prophetic. In late 1946, Greece alleged before the U.N. Security 
Council that neighboring States were interfering in its internal affairs by 
providing arms and equipment to insurgents.45 A commission tasked by the 
Council with investigating the situation concluded that support by Albania, 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia qualified as a “threat to the peace.”46 Meanwhile, the 
Soviet Union made claims to parts of eastern Turkey and sought a degree of 
 
notably in the International Security Assistance Mission in Afghanistan that was originally established pursuant 
to U.N. S.C. Res. 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001). From 2003, it led the operation. ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan (2001–
2014), NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_ 
69366.htm.  
 42 LORD ISMAY, NATO: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS 1949–1954 12 (1954).  
 43 U.N. Charter supra note 5, art. 51.  
 44 Winston S. Churchill, Address at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri: The Sinews of Peace (Mar. 
5, 1946) in The Sinews of Peace, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Mar. 5, 1946), https://www.nato. 
int/cps/en/natohq/news_16942.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
 45 Arthur L. Goodhart, The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, in 79 RECUIEL DES COURS 183, 211–12 (1951). 
 46 Id.  
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control over the Dardanelles.47 By early 1948, the Communist Party had gained 
or seized power throughout Eastern Europe—the Soviet “sphere of influence”—
despite the 1945 Declaration of Liberated Europe issued by Roosevelt, Churchill 
and Stalin at the Yalta Conference, according to which the three committed 
themselves to free elections.48  
To address such situations of international instability, the U.N. Charter had 
called for the establishment of a United Nations armed force pursuant to Articles 
43 through 48. But discussions in the U.N. Military Staff regarding that force 
led nowhere.49 In its absence, and given the growing tension between East and 
West, the right of self-defense took on new meaning.  
President Truman, in response to tension with the Soviet Union, set forth the 
so-called Truman Doctrine in a March 1947 speech to Congress.50 The Truman 
Doctrine provided for the delivery of aid to both Greece and Turkey on the basis 
that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”51 
Truman’s address marked the commencement of the Cold War. That June, U.S. 
Secretary of State George Marshall announced aid to Europe that would become 
known as the Marshall Plan.52 Sixteen European States, as well as the French, 
British, and American zones of occupation in Germany, took advantage of the 
Plan; the Communist States did not.53  
Europe was now divided intractably between two competing blocs. As a 
result, the United States adopted a policy of “containment,” so-named because 
it was designed to contain the “expansive tendencies” of the Soviet Union.54 The 
 
 47 Id.  
 48 Yalta Conference Agreement, Declaration of a Liberated Europe, Feb. 11, 1945. 
 49 See U.N. Charter supra note 5, arts. 43–48. 
 50 Harry S. Truman, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress (March 12, 1947), in Truman 
Doctrine,YALE AVALON PROJECT (1947), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp. 
 51 Id.  
 52 George C. Marshall, The Marshall Plan Speech, Harvard University (June 5, 1947), in The Marshall 
Plan Speech, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (1947), https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1947/s470605a_e.htm. 
 53 To implement the Marshall Plan, the States receiving aid and the Commanders of the French, U.S. and 
U.K. occupation zones established the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation on April 16, 1948. See 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/general/ 
organisationforeuropeaneconomicco-operation.htm. 
 54 The term “containment” and the reference to “expansive tendencies” are drawn from the famous “X 
Article,” which appeared in the journal Foreign Affairs. Drawn from the February 1946 “Long Telegram” by 
the Moscow Deputy Chief of Mission, George Kennan, the X Article was originally a report written for Secretary 
of Defense James Forrestal in January 1947. Kennan published it under the pseudonym “X” in July 1946. See 
X, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566, 575 (July 1947); Telegram, George Kennan to George 
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confrontation between East and West would soon play out militarily with the 
Soviet blockade of Berlin between June 1948 and May 1949.55 The specter of 
U.S. and Soviet forces facing each other across Checkpoint Charlie brought the 
use of force and self-defense provisions that had been set forth in the Charter 
into stark relief. 
The immediate postwar period was also characterized by the establishment 
of a number of treaty-based defensive arrangements. In 1947 the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance was adopted in Rio de Janeiro.56 Article 3 of the 
Rio Treaty provided that:  
an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be 
considered as an attack against all the American States, and 
consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to 
assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the 
Charter of the United Nations.57  
A careful parsing of the text confirms that Article 3’s collective defense 
arrangement applied not only to armed attacks by non-Party States, but also to 
those that might be launched by one of the Parties to the instrument against 
another. 
In Europe, the United Kingdom and France agreed to come to each other’s 
assistance against any future German aggression in the 1947 Treaty of Dunkirk, 
which referred in its preamble to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.58 The following 
year the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries adopted the 
Brussels Treaty, described in its preamble as, inter alia, a treaty for “collective 
defense.”59 Article IV provided, “If any of the High Contracting Parties should 
be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties 
will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance 
 
Marshall, Feb. 22, 1946, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/ 
6-6.pdf [hereinafter Long Telegram]. 
 55 The Berlin Blockade, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ 
declassified_136188.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
 56 Rio Treaty, supra note 5. 
 57 Id. art. 3. 
 58 Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the United Kingdom and France, pmbl. & art. II, 
Mar. 4, 1947, 9 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Treaty of Dunkirk].  
 59 See The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Mar. 17, 
1948, 19 U.N.T.S. 51 [hereinafter Brussels Treaty].  
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in their power.”60 The agreement demonstrated the extent to which the West was 
eyeing the Soviet Union and its Eastern Europe satellites as possible authors of 
an armed attack meriting application of the self and collective defense provisions 
of the U.N. Charter.61 Belgian Prime Minister, and future NATO Secretary 
General, Henri Spaak confirmed this concern in his September 1948 “Speech of 
Fear” to the U.N. General Assembly:  
La délégation soviétique ne doit pas chercher d’explications 
compliquées à notre politique.  
… 
Savez-vous quelle est la base de notre politique ? C’est la peur. La peur 
de vous, la peur de votre Gouvernement, la peur de votre politique.  
… 
Savez-vous pourquoi nous avons peur? Nous avons peur parce que 
vous parlez souvent d’impérialisme. Quelle est la définition de 
l’impérialisme? Quelle est la notion courante de l’impérialisme? C’est 
celle d’un peuple - généralement d’un grand pays - qui fait des 
conquêtes et qui augmente, à travers le monde, son influence.62 
On the heels of the Brussels Treaty’s adoption, the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, and the Benelux countries began secret talks designed to 
enhance collective defense.63 Following the introduction by Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg of a Senate Resolution authorizing the development of collective 
defense arrangements—without committing the United States to engage in 
defensive measures except in accordance with US constitutional processes—
open negotiations with European States commenced. 64 In April 1949, the North 
Atlantic Treaty was signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.65 By the preamble to the instrument, the Parties resolved 
“to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and 
 
 60 Id. art. 4.  
 61 In 1954 the treaty was amended to create the Western European Union. Protocol Modifying Treaty for 
Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-Defence, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 
U.N.T.S. 342; Protocol on Forces of Western European Union, Oct. 23, 1954, 211 U.N.T.S. 358. 
 62 Paul-Henri Spaak, Speech to the U.N. General Assembly, Washington (Sept. 28, 1948).  
 63 These were known as the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security. The Records of the talks, since 
declassified, are available on the website of the Department of State’s Office of the Historian, 
https://history.state.gov/. The French were intentionally excluded. Alex Danchev, Taking the Pledge: Oliver 
Franks and the Negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, 15(2) DIPLOMATIC HIST. 199, 201 (1991). See generally 
Cees Wiebes & Bert Zeeman, The Pentagon Negotiations March 1948: The Launching of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, 59(3) INT’L AFF. 351 (1983) (discussing the negotiations).  
 64 S. Res. 239, 80th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1948). 
 65 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1.  
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security.”66 The North Atlantic Treaty was ratified by the U.S. Senate in July 
and came into force on August 24, 1949.67  
Moscow was not amused. The Soviet Union claimed that the treaty 
“contradicts the principles and aims of the United Nations organisation and the 
commitments which the Governments of the United States of America, Great 
Britain and France have assumed under other treaties and agreements.”68 It 
further pointed out that “[o]f the great powers only the Soviet Union is excluded 
from among the parties to this treaty,” alleging that this “can be explained only 
by the fact that this treaty is directed against the Soviet Union.”69 
In response Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, declared that the treaty was 
purely defensive in nature.70 According to Acheson, “[t]his country is not 
planning to make war against anyone … allegations that aggressive designs lie 
behind this country’s signature of the Atlantic [P]act can rest only on a malicious 
misrepresentation or a fantastic misunderstanding of the nature and aims of 
American Society.”71 Indeed, the operative fulcrum upon which agreement 
rested was Article 5, a collective defense provision.72 Article 5 states that:  
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them 
all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, 
each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-
defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, 
individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it 
deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.73 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall 
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall 
 
 66 Id. at pmbl. 
 67 Richard H. Heindel, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, & Francis O. Wilcox, The North Atlantic Treat in the United 
States Senate, 43 AM. J. INT’L L. 633, 649–51 (1949). 
 68 Text of the Soviet Memorandum on the Atlantic Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1949, http://movies2.nytimes. 
com/library/world/global/040149nato-soviet-text.html.  
 69 Id.  
 70 Acheson Address, supra note 2. 
 71 Id.; See Vojtech Mastny, NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949–56, 
(Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Working Paper No. 35 2002) (on the Soviet Union’s view 
of NATO’s establishment). 
 72 See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.  
 73 Id. During consideration of the treaty, the Senate treated the article as the instrument’s most significant 
provision. Heindel, supra note 67, at 645. 
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be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.74 
Importantly, the drafters followed the Rio Pact’s collective defense format 
rather than that of the Brussels Treaty.75 As with the former, Article 5 did not 
unconditionally commit Parties to come to the defense of another Party.76 This 
represented a victory in the negotiations for North Americans who were hesitant 
to agree in advance to participate in another European conflict.77 Instead, parties 
to the North Atlantic Treaty only committed themselves to those measures in 
collective defense that they deemed necessary in the attendant circumstances.78 
As Acheson explained, “this does not mean that the United States would be 
automatically at war if one of the nations covered by the pact is subject to armed 
attack. Under our Constitution the Congress alone has the power to declare 
war.”79 Nevertheless, lest the wrong conclusion be drawn, the Secretary 
accentuated the US pledge to act in collective defense:  
It is a simple fact, proved by experience, that an outside attack on one 
member of this community is an attack upon all members. We have 
also learned that if free nations do not stand together, they will fall one 
by one…. We and the free nations of Europe are determined that 
history shall not repeat itself in that melancholy particular.80 
By 2019, Article 5 bound twenty-nine nations as member States of the North 
Atlantic Alliance.81 
A. The North Atlantic Treaty Deconstructed 
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) has only approved collective defense of 
an Ally once. On September 12, 2001, the Alliance invoked Article 5 in response 
to the Al Qaeda attacks against the United States the previous day.82 The 
 
 74 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5. 
 75 See Id.; Rio Treaty, supra note 5; Brussels Treaty, supra note 59.  
 76 Schwarzenberger, supra note 2, at 313–14. 
 77 See Sylvain Fournier & Sherrod Lewis Bumgardner, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty: The 
Cornerstone of the Alliance, 34 NATO LEGAL GAZETTE 10–11 (2014). 
 78 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5. 
 79 Acheson Address, supra note 2. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See Montenegro Joins NATO as 29th Ally, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jun. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_144647.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
 82 See Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 
12, 2001). Similarly, the Organization of American States invoked the collective self-defense provisions of the 
Rio Treaty following its finding that “these terrorist attacks against the United States are attacks against all 
American States.” Terrorist Threat to the Americas, OEA/Ser.F/II.24, RC.24/RES.1/01 (Sep. 21, 2001). 
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invocation was conditioned on the premise that the attacks had been directed 
from outside the United States, a fact confirmed on October 2, 2001.83 On 
October 4, the Allies agreed on a package of eight measures requested by the 
United States, to be taken individually and collectively.84 They ranged from 
enhanced intelligence sharing to the deployment of a NATO Airborne Warning 
and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to monitor U.S. airspace in Operation 
Eagle Assist.85 Later that month, NATO launched Operation Active Endeavor, 
a maritime counter-terrorism operation in the Eastern Mediterranean that was 
also based on the invocation of Article 5 by the NAC.86 Active Endeavor 
continued until November 2016, when Operation Sea Guardian, a non-Article 5 
maritime security operation, replaced it.87 
Similarly, NATO has taken “enhanced collective defense” measures 
pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty when threatening situations 
arise. These are designed to deter aggression and facilitate the exercise of 
collective defense under Article 5 should it become necessary.88 For instance, 
NATO deployed Patriot missiles to Turkey in 1991 during the first Gulf War, as 
well as in 2012 to provide counter-missile capabilities in light of the Syrian 
conflict.89 In 2003, it also conducted Operation Display Deterrence in Turkey as 
the situation in Iraq heated up.90 NATO is presently engaged in an air policing 
 
“Australia did likewise, citing Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty in offering to deploy military forces.” Press 
Conference, Prime Minister John Howard, Government Invokes ANZUS Treaty (Sep. 14, 2001), https:// 
australianpolitics.com/2001/09/14/howard-government-invokes-anzus-treaty.html. [hereinafter Government 
Invokes ANZUS]. Article VI of the ANZUS Treaty provides: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the 
Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act 
to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Security Treaty (Aust., N.Z., U.S.), 
art. IV, Sep. 1, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 3422, 131 U.N.T.S. 83, 84.  
 83 Invocation of Article 5 Confirmed, NATO UPDATE (Oct. 2, 2001), https://www.nato.int/docu/update/ 
2001/1001/e1002a.htm#FN1; see Fournier & Bumgardner, supra note 77, at 18 (for a view inside NATO’s 
assessment and decision). 
 84 NATO, Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, on the North Atlantic 
Council Decision on Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks 
against the United States, Oct. 4, 2001, in Statement to the Press, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Oct. 4,2001), 
https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm. 
 85 Id.  
 86 Operation Active Endeavour, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natohq/topics_7932.htm.  
 87 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, supra note 14, ¶ 91. 
 88 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 4 (“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion 
of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”). 
 89 See Collective Defence–Article 5, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jun. 12, 2018), https://www.nato. 
int/cps/fr/natohq/topics_110496.htm?selectedLocale=en.  
 90 The operation consisted of the deployment of AWACS aircraft, missile defenses, and chemical and 
biological defense equipment. See Press Release, NATO, Conclusion of Operation Display Deterrence and 
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mission over the Baltic Sea to deter Russian aggression and has deployed 
multinational battle groups to establish an “enhanced forward presence” in 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.91 At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO 
also identified cyberspace as an operational domain.92 Presently, it is moving to 
enhance its capability to defend against cyber-attacks, by establishing a 
Cyberspace Operations Centre.93 
Despite only being invoked once, self-defense has always lain at the heart of 
the Alliance’s strategic vision. The first strategy document approved by the NAC 
was the December 1949 “Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic 
Area.”94 In setting forth the “general principles [that] are recognized as 
underlying the North Atlantic Treaty defensive organisation,” it observed, “[t]he 
main principle is common action in defense against armed attack through self-
help and mutual aid.95 The immediate objective is the achievement of 
arrangements for collective self-defense among the Atlantic Treaty nations.”96 
Four decades later, the 1991 Strategic Concept reiterated that “[t]he Alliance is 
purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in 
self-defence.”97 
The most recent strategic concept, “Active Engagement, Modern Defense,” 
which was issued at the Lisbon Summit, likewise notes the centrality of Article 
5.98 Although the 2010 document cites crisis management and cooperative 
security as NATO core tasks, it stresses that “[t]he greatest responsibility of the 
Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, 
as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.”99 In this regard, the concept 
treats collective defense broadly to include defending against chemical, 
 
Article 4 Security Consultations, Apr. 16, 2003.  
 91 See NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Feb. 2019), https://www. 
nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/20190213_1902-factsheet_efp_en.pdf; NATO Air Policing, 
NATO ALLIED AIR COMMAND, https://ac.nato.int/page5931922/-nato-air-policing. 
 92 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, supra note 14, ¶ 70. 
 93 Cyber Defense, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ 
topics_78170.htm. 
 94 THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, NATO, Enclosure (D/C 
6/1), ¶ 5 & 5(a), (1949).  
 95 Id.  
 96 Id.  
 97 The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Nov. 8, 1991) ¶ 35, 
[hereinafter New Strategic Concept], https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.  
 98 Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO SUMMIT (Nov. 19–20, 2010), https://www.nato.int/strategic-
concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf. 
 99 Id. ¶ 5. 
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biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, cyber-attacks and terrorism.100 
Leaders of the Alliance again echoed the keystone role of collective defense at 
the 2018 Brussels Summit, emphasizing its applicability to situations involving 
hybrid warfare.101 
1. The Notion of “Collective Defence” 
As a matter of international law, collective defense is an exceptional 
measure. It is a circumstance that “precludes the wrongfulness” of a use of force 
by a State acting defensively, as well as any States coming to its defense.102 In 
other words, it renders lawful what would otherwise be a violation of a the most 
fundamental prohibition of international law. Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty is a manifestation of this ground for the preclusion of wrongfulness vis-
à-vis both the use of force against another State and non-compliance with other 
international law prohibitions and obligations, such as the obligation to respect 
the sovereignty of other States.103 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered the right of collective 
self-defense in the 1986 Nicaragua case.104 Pointing to the term “inherent right” 
in the text of Article 51, as well as General Assembly resolutions like the 
Resolution on Friendly Relations, the Court found the right to be customary in 
nature.105 Although Judge Oda questioned the finding in his Dissenting Opinion, 
there is, as Yoram Dinstein has opined, “hardly any doubt that it constitutes an 
integral part of customary international law as it stands today.” 106 Indeed, it has 
been invoked on many occasions, some merited, others a subterfuge for 
intervention. For instance, collective self-defense was the justification for: (1) 
U.S. action in Lebanon in 1958; (2) US action in Vietnam between 1961 and 
1975; (3) Soviet involvement in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan in 1968 in 
1979 respectively; (4) support by the United States and its partners of Kuwait 
 
 100 Id. ¶ 19. 
 101 Brussels Summit, supra note 15, ¶ 1, 21. 
 102 G.A. Res. 56/83 annex, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 21(Dec. 12, 
2001). The Articles on State Responsibility are an authoritative restatement of customary international law on 
State responsibility prepared the International Law Commission. See id.  
 103 See Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). 
 104 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 
Rep. 14, ¶ 193 (June 27).  
 105 Id.; G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 106 Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 93–95 (Oda J., dissenting) (Judge Oda questioned whether the 
Court had sufficiently inquired into the pre-Charter existence of self-defense and raising doubt as to its 
customary status.); U.N. Charter supra note 5, art. 51; DINSTEIN, supra note 17, ¶ 799. 
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following Iraq’s 1990 invasion; and (5) coalition support of US Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan between 2003 and 2014.107 
Collective defense may be exercised in a number of ways. It encompasses 
coming to the assistance of a State that is engaged in self-defense, even to the 
point of providing the entire defense of that State. Defensive aid may be 
provided: (1) by a single State; (2) multiple individual States operating 
separately in support of the victim State; (3) an ad hoc coalition of States 
operating collaboratively; or (4) a standing multinational military organization, 
such as NATO. Provision of collective defense by a standing multinational 
organization offers a number of key benefits. They include the advance training 
of military forces from member States that may be called upon to operate 
together, development of joint doctrine, establishment of command-and-control 
relationships, cooperation in the building of national force structure and the 
acquisition of equipment, the sharing of military facilities, and joint and 
combined planning in anticipation of an armed attack. The establishment of 
NATO and the vesting of it with collective defense responsibilities under Article 
5 makes possible realization of these benefits. 
2. Armed Attack 
The determinative condition precedent to the exercise of either self or 
collective defense is the occurrence of an “armed attack.”108 Obviously, the 
meaning of the term as used in Article 5 cannot be broader than that which 
applies to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.109 The question is whether it enjoys a 
narrower meaning. It would appear not, for the references in the 2010 Strategic 
Concept and the Brussels Summit Declaration to terrorism, cyber-attacks, and 
hybrid warfare confirm that Article 51 is understood as extending to all armed 
attacks, however launched, employing whatever means and of whatever scale.110 
The dilemma is that no conclusive definition of the term “armed attack,” as 
used in Article 51 or customary law, exists in international law.111 Nevertheless, 
in its Nicaragua judgment, the ICJ noted that there “appears now to be general 
 
 107 See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 176 (4th ed. 2018). Operation 
Enduring Freedom has been replaced by Operation Freedom’s Sentinel. Id.  
 108 See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5.  
 109 See id.; U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 51. 
 110 See Brussels Summit, supra note 15.  
 111 G.A. Res 3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974), Although some point to the Definition of Aggression 
Resolution the plain text of the instrument confirms that it was not meant to serve this purpose. See, e.g. id. ¶¶ 2, 
4 pmbl., art. 6. 
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agreement on the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed 
attacks.”112 Despite the Court’s failure to offer guidance as to the content of that 
agreement, there is broad consensus that an attack resulting in significant 
physical damage or injury would so qualify.113 
Beyond that consensus lie two quandaries. The first deals with the requisite 
gravity of the underlying use of force against which the defensive action is taken. 
In Nicaragua, the Court distinguished between “the most grave forms of the use 
of force (those constituting an armed attack) [and] other less grave forms.”114 
The only example provided to illustrate the difference was that of a “mere 
frontier incident,” which would qualify as a use of force but not an armed 
attack.115 This example provoked controversy, and rightfully so since most 
States would be unlikely to conclude they are prohibited from responding with 
force to a penetration of their border by another State’s armed forces.116 Further, 
the Court seemed to signal that the gap between a simple use of force and an 
armed attack was relatively narrow when, in its 2003 Oil Platforms judgment, it 
was unwilling to exclude the possibility that using naval mines against a single 
warship would qualify as the latter.117 
It is accordingly problematic to identify a precise threshold of severity at 
which the NAC could lawfully invoke Article 5. Further complicating matters is 
the fact that the United States has long taken the position that no distinction is 
to be made between the threshold for violation of the use of force prohibition 
and that applying to the right of self-defense against an armed attack. In its view, 
every use of force is equally an armed attack, although no other Ally has 
expressly adopted this position.118 As a result, it is uncertain how the NAC 
 
 112 Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195. 
 113 See, e.g. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS, r. 
71 and accompanying commentary (Michael N. Schmitt ed. 2017) (supporting this proposition) [hereinafter 
TALLINN MANUAL 2.0]. 
 114 Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 191. 
 115 Id. ¶ 195. 
 116 DINSTEIN, supra note 17, ¶¶ 550–53. 
 117 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶ 72 (Nov. 6). 
 118 See, e.g. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, ¶ 16.3.3.1 (Dec. 
2016); see also Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to the 
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference (Sept. 18, 2012), in 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (2012); William 
H. Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 295, 299–302 (2004); Abraham 
D. Sofaer, International Law: Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 93–96 (1989). 
The three authors served as the U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser. 
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would respond to a U.S. request to invoke Article 5—or to one by another Ally—
in a situation involving a relatively low-level use of force. 
This situation might well arise with respect to the second quandary related 
to the notion of armed attack, the treatment of hostile cyber operations against a 
member of the Alliance. NATO has adopted the stance that should cyber 
operations qualify as an armed attack; the victim State would be entitled to 
request invocation of Article 5 by the NAC.119 This position is in accord with 
the generally accepted view that Article 51 of the U.N. Charter applies in the 
cyber context.120  
The challenge lies in identifying those cyber operations that would so 
qualify. General consensus exists that a cyber operation causing significant 
injurious or physically destructive consequences would amount to an armed 
attack.121 The unanswered question is whether one having severe albeit neither 
injurious nor physically destructive effects could ever constitute an armed attack 
and, if so, under what circumstances.122 For instance, may a State treat a cyber 
operation that causes widespread and severe disruption to its economic system 
as an armed attack? Or do hostile cyber operations that seriously interfere with 
the functioning of critical cyber infrastructure qualify as such if the interference 
has not caused injury or physical damage? 
States have been extremely hesitant to express opinio juris on the matter. 
Among the Allies, Dutch Minister of Defence Ank Bijleveld has offered the 
most direct comment. Speaking at an event to mark the first anniversary of the 
publication of the Tallinn Manual 2.0, the Minister cited cyber operations 
causing “serious disruption with long-lasting consequences.”123 She explained, 
 
 119 Press Release, Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating 
in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, ¶ 72, Sept. 5, 2014. See also Jens Stoltenberg, NATO 
Secretary General, Cyber Defence Pledge Conference, Ecole Militaire, Paris, (May 15, 2018), in Speech by 
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Pledge conference (Ecole militaire, Paris), NORTH ATLANTIC 
TREATY ORG. (2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_154462.htm.  
 120 See, e.g. Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Dev. In the Field of Info. and Telecomm. in 
the Context of Intl Security, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/70/174 (July 22, 2015). Interestingly, Russia and China, inter 
alia, refused to include mention the right of self-defense in an aborted report of the 6th U.N. Group of 
Governmental Experts in 2017. See Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law Politicized: The 
U.N. GGE’s Failure to Advance Cyber Norms, JUST SECURITY (June 30, 2017). 
 121 TALLINN MANUAL 2.0, supra note 113, r. 71, ¶ 8. 
 122 Id. r. 71, ¶¶ 9–12. 
 123 Ank Bijleveld, Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, We Have to Steer the Cyber 
Domain before it Steers Us (June 21, 2018), in We Have to Steer the Cyber Domain before it Steers Us, 
https://www.defensie.nl/onderwerpen/cyber-security/downloads/toespraken/2018/06/20/toespraak-minister-
bijleveld-op-het-symposium-tallinn-manual-2.0.  
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“for instance, if a cyber-attack targets the entire Dutch financials system…or if 
it prevents the government from carrying out essential tasks such as policing or 
taxation…it would qualify as an armed attack…and…trigger a [S]tate’s right to 
defend itself even by force.”124  
As reflected in the Minister’s comments, States are likely to focus on the 
severity of the consequences generated by the hostile cyber operation, rather 
than their nature—e.g., destructive or nondestructive—or the mechanism 
causing them—kinetic or cyber—when considering whether to characterize 
them as an armed attack. But until States start publicly to add texture to the 
discussion, the NAC will inevitably have to employ a “know it when I see it” 
approach to invoking Article 5 in cases of cyber incidents lacking injurious or 
destructive effect. 
Further, a question that has animated discourse as to the scope of the right 
of self-defense is whether a hostile operation launched by non-State actors from 
abroad—domestic terrorism is not encompassed in the international law right of 
self-defense—can ever qualify as an “armed attack,” such that the victim State 
may respond at the use of force level on the basis of the law of self-defense. 
There is no question, as observed in the Nicaragua judgment, that “‘the sending 
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to 
amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or 
its substantial involvement therein,’” would be an armed attack by the State 
concerned, thereby permitting a forceful response against both that State and the 
non-State actors.125  
But whether Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and customary international law 
encompass an attack by non-State actors who lack the Nicaragua relationship to 
a State remains unsettled. The better view, in light of the extensive post 9/11 
State practice of responding to attacks by non-State groups such as Al Qaeda 
and Daesh, and the absence of any limitation on the right of self-defense to 
attacks launched by or attributable to States in the text of Article 51, is that it 
does.126 However, on two occasions the ICJ has questioned application of the 
 
 124 Id.  
 125 Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195, citing art. 3, ¶ (g), of G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), supra note 
111. 
 126 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN 
WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OF AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 2 (2011) [hereinafter White 
Paper], http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kmayer/408/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf. (for the US position on the 
matter); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American 
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right to non-State actor attacks in situations not meeting the Nicaragua 
standard.127 
In that Article 5 derives directly from Article 51 of the Charter, the same 
question presents itself vis-à-vis the former. In this regard, it appears that the 
Alliance has adopted the position that Article 5 extends to non-State actor 
attacks.128 Although there are suggestions that the intent of the drafters might 
have been to limit Article 5 to armed attacks by States, the only time the NAC 
has invoked the provision was in response to an attack by a non-State actor, Al 
Qaeda.129 Both of the ensuing Article 5 operations were intended to forestall 
further attacks by the group or other transnational terrorists.130  
That the Alliance perceives actions by non-State actors, especially terrorists, 
as a direct threat is a point, as noted above, made in the current NATO strategic 
doctrine and at the organization’s most recent summit.131 Secretary General Jens 
Stoltenberg has also emphasized the flexibility of Article 5. Speaking in 
September 2018 at the 9/11 Memorial, the Secretary General noted that before 
9/11, “the whole idea with Article 5 was to defend European Allies against [the] 
Soviet Union sending the battle tanks over something called the Fulda gap in 
 
Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010); David Kaye, 
International Law Issues in the Department of Justice White Paper on Targeted Killing, 17 ASIL INSIGHTS 8, 
n.1 (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/8/international-lawissues-department-justice-
white-paper-targeted-killing#_edn1 (for substantiation of the White Paper); Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Law: A 
Reply to U.N. Special Rapporteur Emmerson, 55 VA. J. INT’L L. DIGEST 13, 16–17 (2014)(on the author’s views); 
Michael N. Schmitt, Counter-terrorism and the Use of Force in International Law, 32 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. 
RTS 53–116 (2002) [hereinafter Counter-terrorism] (on the author’s views). 
 127 Armed Activities on Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 143, 
146–47 (Dec. 19, 2019); Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 65, 139, 150 (July 9). Both decisions were controversial, even among 
members of the Court. See, e.g., Congo, 2005 I.C.J. at 337, ¶ 11 (separate opinion of Judge Simma); Wall, 2004 
I.C.J. at 215, ¶ 33 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins); id. at 229–30, ¶ 35 (separate opinion of Judge 
Kooijmans); id. at 242–43, ¶ 6 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal). 
 128 In the 1999 Strategic Concept, terrorism had already been identified as a threat to the Alliance. New 
Strategic Concept, supra note 97. 
 129 Heindel, supra note 67, at 645 (“Since the principal objective of the Treaty is to safeguard the security 
of the North Atlantic area, only such armed attacks as threaten that security are contemplated. This rules out 
violence of irresponsible groups and refers, as Article 51 of the Charter clearly contemplates, to an armed attack 
of one state against another.”); Note that the Organization of American States and ANZUS also invoked the 
collective defense provision of their treaties, thereby confirming their view that self-defense extended to non-
State actors’ armed attacks. See Government Invokes ANZUS, supra note 82. 
 130 See The Article 5 NATO Medal (Operation Eagle Assist), AIR FORCE PERSONNEL CENTER (July 27, 
2016), https://www.afpc.af.mil/About/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/873203/the-article-5-nato-medal-operation-
eagle-assist/; Operation Active Endeavour, supra note 86. 
 131 See Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the 
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, supra note 98; Brussels Summit, supra note 15, ¶¶ 21, 28.  
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Germany.”132 According to the Secretary-General, 9/11 taught the Alliance to 
be prepared for the unexpected.133 In that regard, he cited a “more assertive 
Russia,” terrorism and cyber, although he cautioned that the emphasis should be 
“less on trying to predict” and “more on how to be able to react to deal with and 
manage, if and when surprises happen.”134 It is clear that he does not consider 
the application of Article 5 to either be limited to attacks launched by States or 
to particular genre of attacks. 
Beyond the material scope of the right of self-defense lies temporal 
uncertainty. The question is whether Article 5 may be invoked anticipatorily, 
that is, may self or collective defense justify the taking of forceful measures 
before the armed attack is launched? This is a long-standing point of contention 
in international law, for the text of Article 51 appears to address only armed 
attacks that are underway.135 
Most States and contemporary international law scholars are of the view that 
Article 51 must necessarily be understood as allowing for anticipatory action.136 
After all, it would be foolhardy for States to believe themselves obliged to “take 
the first hit” or required to rely solely upon the Security Council to deal with 
imminent threats of armed attack. The challenge is identifying when a State’s 
anticipatory right matures.137  
The traditional approach is to consider the issue in terms of temporal 
proximity. Advocates look to the famous 19th-century exchange of diplomatic 
notes between the United States and Great Britain over the Caroline incident.138 
There, US Secretary of State Daniel Webster suggested that defensive uses of 
 
 132 Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at 
the National September 11 Memorial & Museum, New York (Sept. 26, 2018) in Remarks by NATO Secretary 
General Jens Stoltenberg at the National September 11 Memorial & Museum, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. 
(2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_158298.htm.  
 133 Id.  
 134 Id.  
 135 See Nolte & Randelzhofer, supra note 30, ¶¶ 49–50. 
 136 Id.  
 137 See, e.g. Jeremy Wright, Attorney General, Modern Law of Self-Defence, The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, London (Jan. 11, 2017); Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual 
Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 770 (2012). 
 138 See Nolte & Randelzhofer, supra note 30, ¶¶ 49–50. 
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force are permissible when there is “a necessity of self-defence, instant, 
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”139  
This approach was suitable during a period in which an adversary’s 
aggressive intent and its steps preparatory to an attack were often visible. 
Examples include the movement of troops to the border, activation of reserve 
forces, and aircraft “stand down” to permit maintenance and uploading of 
munitions. Indeed, during the Cold War, NATO regularly monitored Soviet and 
other Warsaw Pact forces for such “indications and warnings” of attack. 
Although they might not give the NAC a great deal of warning, there was a 
general sense that an attack would not manifest as a total “bolt out of the blue.” 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President George Bush issued his 2002 
US National Security Strategy.140 Despite sparking a major controversy over the 
notions of “preemptive” and “preventive” defense, the strategy perceptively 
identified two significant changes in the nature of the 21st Century threats many 
States face.141 The first is that, as tragically illustrated on September 11, an 
armed attack is likely to occur with no warning. Indeed, attacking without 
warning is the objective of terrorist operations, for advance notice would usually 
allow the victim State to foil the attack. Second, President Bush noted that in 
light of growing access to weapons of mass destruction, the first blow in an 
armed attack could be catastrophic.142 These accurate observations have 
underpinned reconsideration of the temporal approach. An alternative approach 
that has gained traction is to treat the right of anticipatory self-defense as having 
matured upon the occurrence of three conditions.143 First, the prospective 
attacker either must have the capability to conduct the attack in question or the 
acquisition of such capability must be imminent.144 Second, the attacker must 
have formed a definitive intent to mount the armed attack.145 Finally, the State 
resorting to self-defense may only act during the “last window of opportunity,” 
 
 139 Correspondence between Great Britain and The United States, Respecting the Arrest and Imprisonment 
of Mr. McLeod, for the Destruction of the Steamboat Caroline, Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox, 29 BSP 
1129, 1137–38 (1857). 
 140 White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2002) [hereinafter 
National Security Strategy]. 
 141 See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies and International Law, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
513 (2003) [hereinafter Preemptive Strategies]. 
 142 See National Security Strategy, supra note 140, at 15. 
 143 Counter-Terrorism, supra note 126, at 65 (the author first proposed the interpretation in 2002); see also 
Preemptive Strategies, supra note 141, at 534–35. 
 144 Counter-Terrorism, supra note 126, at 65; see also Preemptive Strategies, supra note 141, at 534–35. 
 145 Id.  
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that is, at the point when the failure to act defensively would effectively deprive 
that State of its ability to prevent the forthcoming armed attack.146 The 
paradigmatic example is that of a terrorist group intent on conducting attacks 
against a State. If the State locates the leadership of the group and reasonably 
concludes that it may not have another opportunity to strike those leaders or 
otherwise foil the attack before it unfolds, the State may act even though the 
precise moment and location of the terrorist attack is unknown. 
Although the United States has now been adopted this approach to 
anticipatory self-defense,147 most other States have not taken a position on the 
matter. Therefore, it likely would prove contentious if presented to the NAC for 
action. At least in the immediate future, therefore, it is doubtful that the NAC 
would invoke Article 5 in such circumstances. 
Complicating matters is a degree of uncertainty regarding whether Article 5 
itself allows for anticipatory self-defense. Sylvain Fournier and Lewis 
Bumgardner have perceptively noted, for instance, that the provision does not 
include the word “inherent” that is found in Article 51 of the Charter.148 They 
query whether this signals that Article 5 was intended to be limited to situations 
fitting squarely within the textual four corners of Articles 5 and 51, even if 
anticipatory self-defense was permissible under customary—inherent—
international law when the North Atlantic Treaty was drafted.149  
Although such an interpretation is colorable, the better position is that no 
distinction can be read into Article 5 between the inherent customary right of 
self-defense and the separate treaty-based right reflected in Article 51, to which 
Article 5 refers. It must be recalled that two Allies, Italy and Portugal, were not 
members of the United Nations in 1949—both joined in 1955.150 If the absence 
of reference to the “inherent right” in Article 5 had been meant to limit the 
provision’s application to those armed attacks encompassed in Article 51 as read 
without the term “inherent,” those two Alliance members, as non-Parties to the 
 
 146 Id.  
 147 White Paper, supra note 126, at 7. Other countries have embraced the last window of opportunity 
standard. See George Brandis, Australian Attorney-General, The Right of Self-Defence Against Imminent 
Armed Attack in International Law, University of Queensland (Apr. 11, 2017), in The Right of Self-Defence 
Against Imminent Armed Attack in International Law, EJIL: TALK! (2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-right-
of-self-defence-against-imminent-armed-attack-in-international-law/; Jeremy Wright, supra note 137. 
 148 Fournier & Bumgardner, supra note 77, at 26. 
 149 Id.  
 150 See Member states, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html 
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U.N. Charter—with its reference to the inherent right—would have fallen 
outside Article 5’s protective scope altogether.  
This cannot have been the drafters’ intent; therefore, it seems clear that the 
Article 5 reference to Article 51 necessarily was meant to encompass defensive 
rights, including anticipatory self and collective defense, under both Article 51 
and customary law. In support of this conclusion, note that the International 
Court of Justice observed in its Nicaragua judgment that the inherent right does 
not differ materially from its treaty-based analogue.151 Indeed, the mainstream 
view in international law remains that both Article 51 and customary 
international law admit of a right of anticipatory self-defense. For example, this 
was the position taken by the U.N. High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change in 2004.152 Accordingly, Article 5 can best be characterized as having 
included, and still including, a right of anticipatory self and collective defense. 
NAC authorization of operations on the basis of anticipatory collective defense 
might be fraught with political obstacles, but the legal basis for doing so resides 
comfortably within the North Atlantic Treaty. 
3. Geographical Scope 
The text of Article 5 sets forth its casus foederis—the event that activates 
the duty to render assistance—an armed attack launched against a member of 
the Alliance “in Europe or North America.”153 Article 6 expounds on the 
geographical scope: 
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the 
Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: 
 on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, 
on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of 
Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the 
Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; 
 on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or 
over these territories or any other area in Europe in which 
occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date 
 
 151 Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 176. 
 152 U.N. Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure 
World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶ 188, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
 153 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5. 
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when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or 
the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.154 
It is important to note that the qualifying armed attack may be on forces 
based outside their own State’s territory so long as they are located in the area 
set forth in Article 6, as in the case of the U.S. forces stationed in Europe.155 
The Alliance has adjusted the geographical scope set forth in Article 6 on 
multiple occasions. In 1951, the text referring to Turkey was added by means of 
a Protocol in response to the accession of Greece and Turkey.156 At the same 
time, the original 1949 text dealing with occupation forces was slightly modified 
to clarify Article 5’s application to forces in occupied Germany.157 The 
modification was a reaction to the 1948 Berlin Blockade and the subsequent 
increase in tension with the Soviet Union and its satellites.158  
A dozen years later, the NAC declared that the reference to the Algerian 
Departments of France was inapplicable as of July 3, 1962, the date France 
recognized Algerian independence.159 During the drafting of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, the United States and Canada objected to a collective defense 
commitment that extended to the colonies of Alliance members out of concern 
that NATO might be used to maintain the European colonial relationships.160 
However, at the time Algeria was officially a department of France; hence its 
inclusion in the original scope of the instrument.161  
While Article 6 sets out the geographical scope of the armed attack that can 
trigger the NAC’s right to invoke Article 5, it does not limit that of NATO 
Article 5 operations or those mounted on any other basis. The difference is 
subtle but important. For example, an armed attack against U.S. forces in Asia 
would not trigger Article 5, but an attack from Asia into the United States would 
 
 154 Id. art. 6. 
 155 See id.  
 156 Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and Turkey, art. 2, Oct. 17, 1951, 3 
U.S.T. 43, 126 U.N.T.S. 350. 
 157 See id. The original text of Article 6 read “on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe.” The 
Original North Atlantic Treaty, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., art. 6 (1949), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_ 
fl2014/assets/pdf/history_pdf/20161122_E1-founding-treaty-original-treaty_NN-en.pdf. Note that the revised 
text focuses on the territory concerned, not the forces themselves. See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 
5. 
 158 See Fournier & Bumgardner, supra note 77, at 13–14.  
 159 Summary Record, North Atlantic Council, Permanent Headquarters, Paris, XVIe, Jan. 16, 1963, at 
sect. V, https://www.nato.int/ebookshop/video/declassified/doc_files/C-R(63)2.PDF. 
 160 See Fournier & Bumgardner, supra note 77, at 10–11. 
 161 Id. at 13–14.  
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do so. Should the latter situation occur, NATO forces would not be precluded 
from engaging the attacker outside the Euro-Atlantic space on the basis of 
collective defense. 
The Alliance itself has observed that this was the case from the beginning, 
while contemporary NATO summit declarations have confirmed the 
interpretation on multiple occasions. 162 As an example, the 2002 Reykjavik 
Summit Communiqué noted, “To carry out the full range of its missions, NATO 
must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, 
sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives.”163 
Similarly, the NATO Heads of State agreed at the 2018 Brussels Summit that 
“We are committed to strengthening our ability to deploy and sustain our forces 
and their equipment, throughout the Alliance and beyond….”164  
It should be cautioned that the Article 6 geographical limitations apply only 
to Article 5 operations. Since 1999, other NATO operations, known as “Non-
Article 5 Crisis Response Operations” (NA5CRO), have been common.165 These 
have ranged from providing assistance to the United States following Hurricane 
Katrina to engaging in combat in Libya and Afghanistan.166 The legal basis for 
such operations, including those in which force is employed, is on firm footing 
when mandated or authorized by a U.N. Security Council resolution under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, as was the case with respect to operations in Libya 
and Afghanistan.167 By contrast, the legality of Operation Allied Force, the 1999 
NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 
 
 162 See Collective Defence–Article 5, supra note 89. “According to one of the drafters of the Treaty, 
Theodore C. Achilles, there was no doubt in anybody’s mind that NATO operations could also be conducted 
south of the Tropic of Cancer.” Nato Public Diplomacy Division, NATO A–Z PAGES, https://www.nato.int/nato_ 
static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20150316_2014_AZ_pages.pdf. 
 163 Final Communiqué, May 14, 2002, ¶ 5. 
 164 Brussels Summit, supra note 15, ¶ 17. 
 165 The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., ¶ 24. (Apr. 10, 1999), 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm. 
 166 Petra Ochmannova, NATO: Evolution and Legal Framework for the Conduct of Operations, 34 NATO 
LEGAL GAZETTE 31, 33–34 (2014).  
 167 S.C. Res. 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001) (the original resolution establishing the International Security 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan); S.C. Res. 1973 (March 17, 2011) (the resolution that authorized NATO’s 
Operation Unified Protector). 
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response to gross human rights abuses in Kosovo, was of uncertain legality, for 
it was mounted without the Council having adopted such a resolution.168 
4. The Requisite Agreement 
A decision to invoke Article 5 is taken by the NAC, which consists of 
Permanent Representatives of all the Allies, but that also sometimes meets at the 
Foreign Minister, Defense Minister or Head of State or Government level.169 
The NAC’s decision-making authority does not depend upon the level at which 
it meets and its decisions are taken by consensus pursuant to a “silence 
procedure” in which there is no vote on a proposal, but a single objection “breaks 
the silence” and therefore blocks the decision.170 In such a decision-making 
system, individual members exercise exceptional power with respect to the 
invocation of Article 5, for a single Ally may block NATO from taking action 
in the face of an unambiguous, even devastating, armed attack on a member of 
the Alliance. As noted, such discretion was the cost of securing U.S. 
Congressional support for the North Atlantic Treaty after being drawn into two 
world wars in Europe in less than half a century.171  
This risk that an Ally might exercise its authority to block Article 5 action 
has grown measurably since 1949. Originally, the States that comprised the 
Alliance were relatively homogenous and faced a single shared existential threat 
from the Soviet Union and its satellites.172 Today, the group is geographically, 
culturally, religiously and politically diverse, having expanded over the years 
into the Mediterranean region, the Balkans and Eastern Europe.173 Of course, the 
more diverse the Alliance in terms of perspective and national interests, the more 
difficult it will be to achieve consensus on what is the most significant decision 
a State can take in international relations—the decision to resort to armed force. 
Failure of the NAC to achieve consensus regarding whether to invoke Article 
5 would not bar the Alliance’s members from defending themselves in 
 
 168 See, e.g. Bruno Simma, NATO, the U.N. and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1 
(1999). 
 169 North Atlantic Treaty supra note 1, art. 9 (Article 9 establishes the Council). 
 170 Ochmannova, supra note 166, at 35. 
 171 See generally, Aurel Sari, The Mutual Assistance Clauses of the North Atlantic and EU Treaties: The 
Challenge of Hybrid Threats (forthcoming HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 2019) (analyzing the issue).  
 172 A Short History of NATO, supra note 4.  
 173 See Member Countries, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/ 
en/natohq/nato_countries.htm. 
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individual self-defense.174 Nor would it preclude other Allies from coming to its 
defense outside the North Atlantic Treaty framework pursuant to Article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter and customary international law.175  
But a decision by the NAC that an armed attack has occurred would not 
release a State from its individual obligation under Article 51 of the Charter to 
only engage in collective defense if an armed attack is on-going or imminent 
and the use of force to defend against that attack is both necessary and 
proportionate.176 This is because U.N. Charter obligations enjoy primacy over 
those contained in the other treaties, including the North Atlantic Treaty.177 
Further support for this premise is found in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, which provides that “[w]hen a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or 
that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the 
provisions of that other treaty prevail.”178 In the case of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, this principle appears in Article 7’s confirmation that the provisions of 
the instrument do not affect the U.N. Charter rights and obligations of its 
Parties.179 At least in theory, therefore, a State employing force pursuant to a 
NAC collective defense decision could be acting unlawfully if the invocation of 
Article 5 was without basis in international law. 
5. Scope of the Commitment 
Article 5 requires that Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty consider an attack 
against one or more of them to be an attack upon them all and assist the victim(s) 
either by providing assistance directly or in collaboration with other States.180 
However, it caveats this obligation with the phrase “such action as it deems 
necessary.”181 This is a rather complicated formulation, as the “will assist” text 
 
 174 See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5. 
 175 U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 51. 
 176 Nicar. v. U.S, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 176, 194; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 41 (July 8); Oil Platforms, supra note 117, ¶ 43, 73–74, 76; Judgment 
of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany (Sept. 30, 1946), in 22 The Trial of German 
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 177 U.N. Charter, supra note 5, art. 103. Interestingly, the Warsaw Pact Treaty also provided for U.N. 
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Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, arts. 1, 4, Oct. 10, 1955, 219 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 178 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 30(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.  
 179 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 7 
 180 See id. art. 5.  
 181 Heindel, supra note 67, at 636 (the phrase was added to Article 5 following consultation with U.S. 
Senators). 
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in the Article 5 is expressed as an obligation, while the decision of how to assist 
is textually left to individual Allies. The distinction begs the question of whether 
an Alliance member may agree that an armed attack has occurred and 
subsequently decide it is not necessary to provide any assistance or that only 
assistance falling short of that considered necessary by the other Allies is 
needed.  
Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that the provisions of the 
instrument are to be “carried out by the Parties in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes.”182 Thus, even if a State has not blocked 
invocation of Article 5 in the NAC, the decision on committing forces and, if so, 
how to do so, may be subject to domestic law processes and authorities. In the 
United States, limitations are found, for instance, in Article I of the Constitution, 
which grants Congress the power of the purse and the rights to declare war, raise 
armies and maintain a navy, as well as in legislation like the War Powers Act, 
and Authorization for the Use of Military Force.183 The precise parameters of 
these limitations may be the subject of debate, but there is no question that 
Congress could act, in part, to limit the scope and degree of U.S. collective 
defense measures in response to the NAC’s Article 5 invocation.184  
U.S. reticence to be irreversibly bound to the defense of other countries was 
not unique to the North Atlantic Treaty. For example, Article V of the Japan–
U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security provides that “Each Party 
recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the 
administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and 
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional provisions and processes.”185 The provision recognizes that to the 
extent the U.S. Constitution requires the involvement of Congress in an 
authorization to use military force, that process must be followed irrespective of 
 
 182 North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11. The reference was originally located in the preamble, but 
during negotiations moved to Article 11 at the suggestion of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to 
emphasize the importance of compliance with the constitutional processes of the respective member States; 
Heindel, supra note 67, at 636.  
 183 U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 8–9; War Powers Act, 50 U.S.C., §§ 1541-48 (1976); Authorization for Use of 
Military Force, 115 Stat. 224, 224. 
 184 See, e.g. Matthew Waxman, Syria, Threats of Force, and Constitutional War Powers, 123 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 297 (2013); Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 115 (2014). 
 185 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security (U.S.-Japan), art. V, June 19, 1960, 11 UST 1632, TIAS 
4509, 373 U.N.T.S. 186. 
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the collective defense commitment set forth in the instrument. A similar 
provision is found in Article III of the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty.186 
Such discretion has led to disagreement over the nature of Article 5 and 
similar commitments. In response to Michael Glennon’s claim that these 
arrangement represent an “element of non-committal in the commitment,” Aurel 
Sari asserted, “a legal commitment to act nonetheless exists.”187 Perhaps the best 
view is that a State acting in good faith pursuant to the principle pacta sunt 
servanda, as is required by the law of treaties, must not block invocation of 
Article 5 when an armed attack unambiguously occurs against a member of the 
Alliance.188  
Following invocation, each Ally similarly must act in good faith in seeking 
to fulfill its collective defense obligation under Article 5 by providing necessary 
support. This was the sense of Senate Foreign Relations Committee when 
considering the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949: “These words were included in 
article 5 to make absolutely clear that each party remains free to exercise its 
honest judgment in deciding upon the measures it will take to help restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”189 However, should 
constitutional or other domestic law obstacles stand in the way of it doing so, an 
Ally will not be in breach of Article 5 should it fail to offer assistance. 
6. Other Collective Defense Requirements 
In light of the fact that action pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty is an expression of U.N. Charter Article 51, any action taken pursuant to 
the latter is subject to the full panoply of limitations and requirements thereon. 
For instance, it is widely accepted that a condition precedent to exercise of 
collective defense under customary law and Article 51 is a request for assistance 
by the State facing the armed attack.190 As noted by the International Court of 
Justice in its Nicaragua judgment, “It is also clear that it is the State which is the 
victim of an armed attack which must form and declare the view that it has been 
so attacked. There is no rule in customary international law permitting another 
State to exercise the right of collective self-defense on the basis of its own 
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assessment of the situation.”191 In light of the NAC decision-making system, 
should the possibility of invoking Article 5 arise in other than a request by the 
victim State—an unlikely scenario—the presence of the victim State at the NAC 
session considering the matter, and its decision not to object in order to block 
action, could reasonably be interpreted as such a request.  
Before invoking Article 5, the criterion of necessity must be satisfied, and 
any action taken has to be proportionate.192 Necessity requires that non-forceful 
measures be insufficient to address the ongoing armed attack or prevent one that 
is imminent, whereas proportionality limits the scale and scope of defensive 
force employed to that required to meet or prevent the attack.193 The 
International Court of Justice set forth these twin criteria in the Nicaragua, Oil 
Platforms and Armed Activities judgments, as well as the Nuclear Weapons 
advisory opinion.194 Importantly, the NAC’s invocation of Article 5 does not 
release individual members of the Alliance that are acting in collective defense 
from independently assessing necessity and proportionality or relieve them of 
any responsibility for having wrongfully used force in violation of Article 2(4) 
and customary international law in the event the criteria were not satisfied.195 
Article 5 only authorizes collective defense in order “to restore or maintain 
the security of the North Atlantic area.”196 The “restore and maintain . . . 
security” text is drawn from the U.N. Charter.197 Indeed, maintenance of 
international peace and security is the first of the purposes set forth for the 
United Nations in Article 1 of that instrument.198 Additionally, the Charter limits 
actions authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII, such as the use of 
force in the face of a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
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aggression,” to those necessary to “maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”199  
Yet the U.N. Charter imposes no requirement that action in individual or 
collective self-defense serve to restore peace and security that has been breached 
or maintain it in situations where they are at risk.200 For instance, a State is 
entitled to defend itself, and other States are entitled to come to its defense, even 
if defensive action is likely to be destabilizing for the international community, 
perhaps by broadening a conflict, than surrender to an aggressor. By the text of 
Article 5, however, NATO is not entitled to resort to defensive force in support 
of an Ally unless doing so would contribute to the restoration and maintenance 
of security in the region.201 Theoretically, this would bar defensive action 
necessary to defend an Ally if it would be escalatory or otherwise destabilizing 
in the circumstances at hand.  
For instance, a robust NATO response to a low-level armed attack on one of 
the Baltic States arguably could be seen as broadly destabilizing in the East-
West context. Fears of such a strict textual reading of Article 5 barring a response 
would be misplaced. First, to comply with the proportionality criterion of 
collective defense, any NATO action would have to be limited to the force 
required to repel the armed attack, thereby tempering the risk of destabilization 
or escalation. Second, even if a State were to rely upon this highly legalistic 
interpretation to justify an objection to Article 5’s invocation, all other Allies 
would remain permitted to individually, or in concert with other States, come to 
the collective defense of the victim State outside the NATO command 
structure.202 And a failure to respond forcefully to any armed aggression against 
an Alliance member would itself be destabilizing in that it would encourage 
further aggression. This was, after all, one of the key lessons of World War II. 
Finally, Article 5 requires that any action taken be immediately reported to 
the Security Council, as was done in the one case in which the provision was 
invoked by the NAC.203 The requirement to notify is drawn directly from the 
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text of U.N. Charter Article 51. Accordingly, its presence in Article 5 mandates 
no heavier burden than already shouldered pursuant to that article.204  
In the case of the 9/11 attacks, the notification came in a letter from NATO 
Secretary-General Lord Robertson passed to the Security Council through the 
U.N. Secretary-General. It provided, in part,  
Article 5 has thus been invoked, but no determination has yet been 
made whether the attack against the United States was directed from 
abroad. If such a determination is made, each Ally will then consider 
what assistance it should provide. In practice, there will be 
consultations among the Allies. Any collective action by NATO will 
be decided by the North Atlantic Council. The United States can also 
carry out independent actions, consistent with its rights and obligations 
under the U.N. Charter. 
Allies can provide any form of assistance they deem necessary to 
respond to the situation. This assistance is not necessarily military and 
depends on the material resources of each country. Each individual 
member determines how it will contribute and will consult with the 
other members, bearing in mind that the ultimate aim is to “to restore 
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” 
… 
If the conditions are met for the application of Article 5, NATO Allies 
will decide how to assist the United States. (Many Allies have clearly 
offered emergency assistance). Each Ally is obliged to assist the 
United States by taking forward, individually and in concert with other 
Allies, such action as it deems necessary. This is an individual 
obligation on each Ally and each Ally is responsible for determining 
what it deems necessary in these particular circumstances. 
No collective action will be taken by NATO until further consultations 
are held and further decisions are made by the North Atlantic 
Council.205 
Reflecting the key points made earlier, the Alliance insisted on confirming 
that the incident to which it was responding was an armed attack mounted from 
outside the United States. It did so because NATO is not entitled to act in 
collective defense against domestic terrorism. As noted above, the requisite 
confirmation of the attack emanating from abroad was provided the NAC on 
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October 2. The Secretary-General’s notification also pointed out that all the 
members of the Alliance bore the obligation of assisting the United States, 
although each State was entitled to determine for itself the assistance that was 
necessary.206 Lastly, although collective action required the approval of the 
NAC, the notification acknowledged that the United States remained free to 
exercise its right of individual self-defense irrespective of NAC action—or 
inaction. Although not expressly contained in the notification, this would 
necessary include requesting assistance in collective defense from individual 
members of the Alliance or non-NATO States—outside the NATO framework.  
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
President Donald Trump has at times questioned U.S. participation in 
NATO.207 Such short-sighted musing is highly destabilizing, for the collective 
defense commitment resident in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is today 
no less a confession that the U.N. Security Council cannot ensure the security of 
Europe, Canada, and the United States than was the case seven decades ago. And 
the article continues to play a role as a response to Russia’s insidious actions in 
that region, as well as that of other actors, especially transnational terrorist 
groups.  
However, understanding the scope and content of Article 5 has proven 
increasingly challenging over the past seventy years as the regional and global 
security environment became ever more complex and multifaceted. At its 
inception, Article 5 was most likely to operate in an environment in which war 
clouds would appear on the horizon well in advance of an armed attack and in 
which conflict would occur conventionally across geopolitical borders. That is 
no longer the case. The attack to which Article 5 action responds may come 
without warning; the first blow could be cataclysmic; non-State actors may 
attack without the involvement of any State; an attack could involve weapons of 
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mass destruction; the conflict might commence, or even remain entirely within, 
a virtual domain; and the decision-making structure of the Alliance requires 
consensus among more than double the original number of Allies, and that group 
of States has become far more diverse. Such transformations have rendered a 
common legal understanding of the parameters and content of Article 5 ever 
more elusive; they do not inspire sanguinity.  
Nevertheless, optimism may be drawn from the fact that Article 5 has served 
as an effective, albeit imperfect, deterrent against aggression in the region, one 
that likewise has had a counter-escalatory effect. So long as the Allies, especially 
the United States, do not undercut the credibility of the collective defense 
commitment represented by the provision, Article 5 is likely to serve the same 
purposes very effectively well into the foreseeable future.  
 
